Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Kim Brooks

2008

Inter-Nation Equity: The Development of an
Important but Underappreciated International
Tax Value
Kim Brooks

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/kim-brooks/11/

Chapter 17

Inter-Nation Equity: The Development of an
Important but Underappreciated International
Tax Value
Kim Brooks*
1

Peggy and Richard Musgrave’s Insightful Contributions to
International Tax Policy

The difference in the level of income between countries is staggering (Milanovic,
2005).1 The signiﬁcance of trade and investment ﬂows between high- and lowincome countries is only increasing as a consequence of the rising levels of
international trade and investment. One might have thought, then, that the question
of whether and how much each country should tax the income derived from that
trade and investment would have gained increasing importance.
Indeed, modern high-income states have relied on income taxes and redistributive
spending to reduce inequality nationally; yet few states have considered how their
national tax systems might have important implications for international income
ﬂows between high-income and low-income states and how their tax treaties might
be used as a mechanism for achieving a fairer distribution of income internationally.
*
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See also Pogge and Moellendorf on income inequality between countries (2008, pp. xvi–
xvii).
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TAX REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Discussions about the possibilities of tax systems as a means of distributing income
globally, and of acting in the service of the reduction of global inequality, are
nascent, but not new. The foundational, and still leading, contribution to this area of
scholarship is Peggy and Richard Musgrave’s 1972 essay, ‘Inter-Nation Equity’.
This contribution to the conference in honor of Richard Musgrave focuses on
that 1972 essay, and the work that has built on it. Part 2 reviews the 1972 essay in
some detail, highlighting the Musgraves’ arguments and insights into the idea of
inter-nation equity. Part 3 details Peggy Musgrave’s subsequent contributions to
our understanding of inter-nation equity. Part 4 turns to a consideration of some
of the articles that have borrowed from and built on the Musgraves’ work, and
Part 5 offers a description of the state of our understanding about the content of
inter-nation equity and provides some reﬂections on the increased importance of
the concept.

2

Inter-Nation Equity: The 1972 Contribution

Although by 1972 both Richard and Peggy Musgrave had published articles raising
the issue of ‘inter-nation equity’, their ﬁrst extended discussion of the concept is
contained in their 1972 essay of the same name in Richard Bird and John Head’s
collection, Modern Fiscal Issues: Essays in Honor of Carl S. Shoup (Musgrave
and Musgrave, 1972).2 Although Richard Musgrave does not return to it, for
Peggy Musgrave, the issue of inter-nation equity has been an important intellectual
preoccupation from the commencement of her career. Richard Musgrave’s focus on
the subject in 1972 is unsurprising since his immediately preceding work involved
2

I hope this claim does not do a disservice to Peggy Musgrave’s work. She provides an earlier
account of inter-nation equity in two earlier pieces. First, in Taxation of Foreign Investment
Income: An Economic Analysis, although she addresses equity between nations in a general
way, the phrase ‘inter-nation equity’ is only used once, and in that case the use of the concept
is preliminary to the more developed work reﬂected in the 1972 piece (Richman, 1963). She
simply notes: ‘inter-nation equity would also be better served by taxation by residence’ (p. 27).
Second in United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: Issues and Arguments Peggy
Musgrave raises a number of arguments that were later developed in the 1972 piece: (1) the
focus of the article is on the sharing of the tax base, and not so clearly on the national gain/loss
results from the imposition of a tax; (2) the article focuses directly on how a beneﬁts tax would
support inter-nation equity, but does not provide an in depth exploration of other principles;
and (3) the article grapples with the problem of an integrated corporate tax and the application
of the non-discrimination principle, but the 1972 article reveals continuing reﬁnement of the
thinking (1969, pp. 130–133). Indeed, both Musgraves employed the concept of inter-nation
equity prior to 1972. See, for example, Richard Musgrave’s article ‘The Carter Commission
Report’ (1968, pp. 180–181). In a footnote to a brief mention of the inter-nation equities of
an integrated corporate tax coupled with a withholding tax, Musgrave deﬁnes inter-nation
equity as referring ‘to the way in which the tax base involved in inter-national transactions is
divided between the participating countries’. Again, the 1972 article reveals an improvement
on this deﬁnition by shifting the focus from the shared tax base to a focus on the national gain
or loss.
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an examination of tax issues relating to redistribution and inter-jurisdictional tax
problems.3
Given that this 1972 essay forms the starting place for the analysis that follows;
has been frequently misunderstood and inadequately developed by subsequent
scholars; and constitutes the ﬁrst major contribution to our understanding of internation equity, a relatively detailed discussion of the argument made in the piece
seems appropriate. The essay is divided into six parts, each of which makes a worthy
contribution to the literature on equity in international tax: the ﬁrst part sets out the
historical background and current practice for tax base allocation; the second part
discusses the meaning of inter-nation equity, distinguishing it from inter-individual
equity and neutrality; the third part turns to the underlying principles for inter-nation
equity; part four seeks to apply those principles in the context of a single source,
adding the wrinkle of incorporated entities; part ﬁve summarizes the conclusions of
the previous three parts; and part six concludes by considering the complex case of
multiple source states.
The essay commences by posing the foundational normative questions of
international tax in the context of factor movements:
If residents of country A invest in a business incorporated in B and operating
in C, who should be permitted to tax the income on such capital and at what
rate? Should there be a rule pertaining to this, or should unrestricted multiple
taxation apply? Moreover, if there are such rules, should they apply equally
at the corporate and individual level of taxation? (p. 64)
The essay approaches these questions rather generally at ﬁrst – reviewing the now
familiar history of the quest for principles to guide the allocation of the tax base
between jurisdictions commencing in the thirteenth century, and recounted through
to the League of Nations’ modern framing of international tax principles undertaken
in the context of the income tax (including the story of the four economists they
commissioned), and the incorporation of those principles, at least to some degree,
in the 1963 OECD model tax convention. The essay then describes the then current
practice of revenue-base allocation, underlining its mix of residence and source (or
territorial) norms.
After setting out this background, the Musgraves turn to the particular task at
hand: giving some scope to the concept of equity in the context of international
factor movement. As a foil for discussion, the Musgraves present a simple case: an
entire operation (production and sales) located in country B, while the owners are
located in country A, and the country of incorporation is country C.

3

In 1971, he published two articles discussing these issues (Musgrave R. and Gillis, 1971;
Musgrave R., 1971).
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With this illustration in mind, the essay turns to distinguish the concept of internation equity from the evaluative criteria of inter-individual equity and efﬁciency.
The Musgraves emphasize that inter-nation equity deals with the allocation of
national gain and loss, and not the allocation of tax revenue:
Let X, a resident of A, invest in B. Income earned thereon constitutes a
national ‘gain’ to country A. If country B taxes the income earned by X, the
gain accruing to country A as a nation is reduced. This is the issue of internation equity. The fact that the gain accrues to B’s treasury is not the crucial
point. B may pass this gain on to tax-payers by tax reduction, but it still
retains the national gain. Similarly, A has suffered a national loss due to B’s
tax. This national loss results, whether A gives a credit to X for taxes paid to
B, thereby suffering a treasury loss, or whether the income is taxed again and
X is left to bear the burden (p. 68).
The groundwork has been presented: inter-nation equity is not predicated on the
allocation of the tax revenue, but rather on the allocation of national gain, which is
affected by the source country’s decision to tax (or not) the gain. The tax decisions
of the residence state are irrelevant.
The authors then distinguish inter-nation equity from inter-individual equity
and efﬁciency. Inter-individual equity may be national (including only income
from domestic sources) or international (including income no matter where it is
earned in the world), but the primary focus of inter-individual equity is to ensure
that individual taxpayers with the same incomes are treated the same.4 Therefore,
ensuring inter-individual equity has no inter-nation consequences. For example, if
person X earns income in country B, presumably country A can either grant a tax
credit for the taxes paid to country B (if the tax system in A pursues international
inter-individual equity); or a deduction for the taxes paid to country B (if the tax
system in A pursues national inter-individual equity). Whichever form of interindividual equity is pursued, achieving an equitable result requires only that county
A resolve matters with taxpayer X – an entirely national resolution.
The aim of the essay is not to unfold a deﬁnitive deﬁnition of international
efﬁciency, but rather to distinguish that concept from inter-nation equity. The
Musgraves delineate both a ‘world’ point of view and a national interest point of
view of efﬁciency, showing in each case that whether or not B imposes a tax is
irrelevant. In the case of the world approach to efﬁciency (commonly referred to as
capital export neutrality), the Musgraves note that a taxpayer’s decision of where
to invest should not be affected by tax differentials: this articulation of efﬁciency
4

The essay does not address vertical equity, but presumably the reasoning reviewed applies
in the same way. Peggy Musgrave had previously explored the distinction between national
and international approaches to inter-taxpayer equity in United States Taxation of Foreign
Investment Income: Issues and Arguments (1969, p. 122).
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requires country A to grant a tax credit for taxes paid in country B. In the case
of a national interest approach to efﬁciency, efﬁciency is achieved where foreign
investment is undertaken to the point where ‘the return net of foreign tax equals
the domestic return before tax’ (p. 70): this form of efﬁciency requires country A
to allow a deduction for taxes paid in country B. The essential difference between
taxpayer equity from a world and national interest perspective, then, turns on the
tax treatment of foreign-source income in a country’s domestic tax system: are
foreign taxes treated as domestic taxes (and therefore credited, which would secure
international efﬁciency) or are they treated as expenses (and therefore deducted,
which would secure national efﬁciency). Regardless of the model of efﬁciency
pursued, the point is the same: country A can pursue an efﬁcient tax system whether
or not country B chooses to tax.
The Musgraves’ conclusion at the end of this section summarizes their
argument:
…inter-nation equity involves the question of whether B should be permitted
to tax the income which A’s investors derive from investment in B. If such
a tax is imposed by B, it thereby derives a national gain which, in turn,
reduces A’s national gain derived from its foreign investment. This may or
may not involve a loss for A’s treasury, depending on how A chooses to
treat (overlook, deduct, or credit) B’s tax. The treatment, however, has a
bearing on individual equity and the efﬁciency of capital ﬂows. These two
issues may be dealt with one way or another (as, for instance, via crediting or
deduction procedures) whatever is done about B’s right to tax (p. 70).
This part of the essay makes two signiﬁcant contributions. First, it clariﬁes that
the measure of inter-nation equity is not the tax revenue garnered by the country
treasuries, but rather the national gain (or loss). Second, it identiﬁes the subject of
inter-nation equity: it is not individuals, but states.
With these contributions established, the essay turns to an exploration of the
criteria for evaluating whether or not inter-nation equity has been achieved. The
Musgraves explore four possible principles or concerns that could underlie a concept
of inter-nation equity. First, inter-nation equity would be automatically achieved if
a beneﬁts tax system were adopted. According to this approach to taxation, each
jurisdiction charges for the public goods it renders, and ‘[i]nter-nation equity …
would be self-implementing.’ (p. 71) However, the Musgraves suggest that this
principle of inter-nation equity will have only limited application since most taxes
are not beneﬁts taxes. Nevertheless, to the extent that a nation may impose a beneﬁts
levy for the cost of public goods that have been provided to the investor, that levy
may be seen to accord with conceptions of inter-nation equity.
Second, the Musgraves review the residence versus source bases of taxation
to see if either respond to inter-nation equity concerns. They conclude that the
principle of taxation on the basis of residence (that country A can tax X because X
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is a resident of A) has no connection to inter-nation equity. The gain to country A
is unaffected by any tax that A might impose on the basis of residence. In contrast,
taxation based on the source principle (which enables a country to tax income earned
from activities within its borders) does affect inter-nation equity. To the extent that
B imposes a tax on income with a source in its borders, country A’s national gain
is reduced. As part of their review of the distinction between the implications of
residence versus source taxation for inter-nation equity, the Musgraves clarify two
points: (1) although source taxation is generally associated with in rem taxes, a
source tax could be levied on the individual income earned in the source state; and
(2) a non-discrimination principle should be applied in imposing a source tax, such
that X should be taxed in the same way as B’s residents are taxed.
Third, the Musgraves explore the possibility that national rental charges might
be levied in accordance with the pursuit of inter-nation equity. They illustrate the
problem in terms of the share of national gain:
As residents of country A invest in B, A’s capital earnings are moved above
the level which would be obtained from domestic investment. To be sure,
the net gain to country A falls short of its increased capital income because
its labor income will be reduced. However, within certain limits of capital
export at least, country A will gain. Labor income in B will gain from the
capital inﬂow while its own capital income will fall, but, on balance, B also
stands to gain. The question is whether this gain is enough. (pp. 72–73)
The paper then turns to the most difﬁcult case of national rent – the case where
one country is capital rich, and the other is resource rich, but capital poor (in other
words, the case of a high-income country investor in a low-income country with
resources). In this case, the Musgraves assert that B might argue that it can equitably
impose a rental or royalty charge in order to participate in A’s gain. It is reasoned
that if such a charge were appropriate, it should be levied outside of the regular tax
system, and it should apply only to foreign investment.
Finally, the Musgraves turn to address distributional considerations. In this
section of the essay they explore whether tax-imposed adjustments to national
gains and losses might provide a mechanism for compensating for unequal resource
endowments and per capita income. The authors propose a unique solution to the
international distribution inequities: a non-reciprocal, internationally-agreed-to set
of rates for corporate taxes. These agreed-to rates would replace both the corporation
and withholding taxes imposed by country B on income earned by country A
investors. So, for example, the Musgraves propose that a capital-importing country
with per capita income of below $250 (in 1972 dollars) should be able to impose
a rate of 60 per cent on income earned by a resident of a capital exporting country
with per capita income above $1,000. In contrast, a capital-importing country with
a per capita income in excess of $1,000 would be permitted to impose tax at a rate
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of 10 per cent on income earned by a resident of a capital-exporting country with
per capita income below $250 (p. 74).
In this section of the paper in particular, the Musgraves anticipate many of the
concerns that would later come to dominate the international tax reform agenda.
For example, they dismiss the objection that the proposed system will deter capital
inﬂow by responding that provided capital-exporting countries maintain individual
equity and investment-ﬂow neutrality, such a result should not occur. They also
note that their proposal has the advantage of reducing the likelihood of low-rate
competition for foreign capital.
The contributions of this part of the essay are signiﬁcant. Prior to this essay, a
thorough canvassing of the possible underlying principles for inter-nation equity
and an effort to catalogue the consequences of different underlying principles for
concrete tax design had simply not been undertaken. In this part of the paper, the
Musgraves offer tax policy-makers not only a sense of the possible approaches to
tax policy design that would accord with a concept of inter-nation equity; but also
they provide a warning about the risks that would result from the failure to take this
concept seriously: risks that indeed appear to have materialized.
Part four of the paper continues the discussion of inter-nation equity in the
context of a single source country, but turns to address the problems of incorporation.
Incorporation presents two additional complications: ﬁrst, it raises potential
confusion about which country is the country of residence; and second, it introduces
the problem of two levels of taxation: corporate and shareholder.
Both problems derive from the separate tax status imposed on corporations.
In determining the country of residence, the Musgraves ask questions that throw
into relief the difference incorporation makes (assuming that incorporation is the
indicator of residence). First, what happens where a corporation is incorporated
in country A and earns income though a branch in country B? Assuming that the
corporation tax is an absolute tax (imposed directly on the corporation, and not
on its shareholders), and one applies a residence principle, then presumably B is
entitled (under the source principle) to tax the income earned in B and A is entitled
to tax the income earned in B as earned (perhaps granting a credit for the tax already
paid). Second, what happens if the corporation in country A simply incorporates a
subsidiary in country B? Country B now appears to be both the country of source and
residence. Country A can presumably only tax the proﬁts remitted to the corporation
resident there.
This illustration reveals one of the most perplexing issues in international tax
design: how to deal with the separate incorporation of subsidiaries. In their relatively
short analysis here, intended mainly to highlight the challenges incorporation
presents, the Musgraves argue against any policy that would enable both deferral of
tax by country A (i.e. non-taxation of income as it accrued in the corporate subsidiary
resident in country B) and the crediting of corporate taxes paid by the incorporated
subsidiary in country B.
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The inter-nation equity problem becomes more complicated when additional
countries enter the equation, as the Musgraves illustrate:
…in the absence of incorporated subsidiaries, the choice is between permitting
taxation by B (source rule) or by A only (exclusive residence principle). Given
the existence of subsidiaries, there is the additional problem of determining
the ‘residence’ of the subsidiary, be it as its place of incorporation or the
place of incorporation of its parent. If the parent incorporated in A has a
subsidiary incorporated in C but earning income in B, application of the
source rule will determine whether B can tax. Suppose that it can do so and
thus derives a national gain at the expense of A or C, depending on where the
residence is taken to be. But this is not all. If residence is taken to be in C and
C thus is permitted to impose a further tax, A will suffer an additional loss.
The national loss to A in this case depends not only on the level of taxation
in B, but also in C. Whereas in the absence of subsidiaries the matter of
national loss was determined by the application of the source rule only, now
we see that the operation of the residence principle enters into the picture
(p. 77).
This example illustrates the problem of treating the corporate tax as a separate
(or absolute) tax. If the corporation is indeed treated as a separate entity, with no
recognition given for its relationship to its shareholder, then presumably there is
no national loss to A in the illustration above. But since everyone appreciates that
the corporation is really in essence a conduit, and that its separate status is a legal
ﬁction, the analysis inevitably leaves one wondering if the inter-nation analysis
more appropriately should attribute a national loss to A if both B and C subject the
income earned in B to tax.
The second problem posed by incorporation is the possibility of a corporate
and a shareholder level tax. This tax design feature presents a challenge to the
appropriate application of the source principle: should the source state be able to
impose a tax on both the resident corporation and the non-resident shareholder? The
Musgraves conclude that there is no real reason why a source tax should apply to
one form of tax, but not the other. They do, however, underline that if a withholding
tax is imposed on non-residents, to promote non-discrimination that withholding
tax should approximate (to the extent possible) the tax imposed on domestic
shareholders. As a consequence of this position, they conclude that reciprocity in
withholding tax rates is inappropriate.
Part ﬁve claims simply to draw some conclusions from the discussion of internation equity laid out in the previous sections; however, it also adds some additional
substantive punch. This part of the essay offers the following insights:
• taxation on the basis of residence alone would be inequitable for source

countries, especially low-income countries;
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• the appropriate rate for source country taxation should be set in line with

the principle of non-discrimination or with the national rent principle,
adjusted to suit distributional considerations;
• in the case of subsidiaries, the case is complex where there are multiple
residence claims – one solution is to enable the country of incorporation
to tax only where it is also the source country or where it is the country
of primary tax allegiance for the individual shareholders; and
• whatever principle of taxpayer equity is chosen, it should be applied
consistently; for example, if an international approach to inter-taxpayer
equity is chosen, then if the residence company receives a tax credit for
the underlying source corporate tax, it should also be subject to tax on the
earnings (without deferral).
In addition to these conclusions, the Musgraves offer several suggestions for
the improvement of tax treaties, including that tax treaties should not be subject to
bilateral agreements because in the absence of multilateral agreements distributional
aims cannot be met; the withholding tax should be set at a rate that considers the
corporate tax; the principle of reciprocity is not compatible with the principle of nondiscrimination and therefore should not be the guiding principle for negotiations;
the non-discrimination principle is not compatible with the national rental or
redistributional approach and in treaties with low-income countries, high-income
countries ought to enable the pursuit of national rental and redistributional aims;
and separation of passive income sources into distinct categories (ex. interest or
royalties) should be abandoned in favour of a ‘global’ approach that would combine
all gains of capital income into one cluster for tax purposes (pp. 79–80).
In two short paragraphs at the end of this section, the Musgraves offer a radically
different answer, however, to the question of inter-nation equity should it turn out
that the corporate tax falls not on proﬁts, but rather on consumers (as an in-effect
consumption tax):
Imposition of a proﬁts tax by A on its foreign investment…now results in
a national loss to B and a gain to A. This cannot be defended by any of the
rules considered here, whether on beneﬁt, territoriality, or national rental
grounds. For redistributional reasons, similarly, taxation by A would be
inappropriate, since the capital exporting country will hardly be the lowincome country. The residence principle must be rejected in this case. In the
all-shifting world, country A should exempt foreign earnings of its residents
from its proﬁts tax…(p. 81)
The incidence concerns with the imposition of the corporate tax are undeniably
complex. And indeed, the difﬁculty of determining the incidence of the corporate
tax likely explains, at least in part, the many hybrid tax and credit systems countries
have adopted for foreign income earned through a foreign subsidiary.
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Finally, the essay concludes by exploring the effect of multiple source states on
inter-nation equity. In the international environment, the question is how to allocate
proﬁts among multiple states that might make a claim to tax the proﬁts of a company
resident in another jurisdiction. The Musgraves dismiss the ‘permanent establishment’
concept and separate accounting as largely unsatisfactory and arbitrary, lending
themselves to tax evasion. They also conclude that an apportionment formula is not
workable in the absence of international administration. They ultimately argue for
some form of formulary apportionment:
Ultimately, the only satisfactory solution (in line with the conclusions of the
preceding section) would be the taxation of such income on an international
basis with subsequent allocation of proceeds on an apportionment basis
among the participating countries, making allowance for distributional
considerations. This is especially called for in view of the rapid growth of
the multinational corporation (p. 85).
Again, the Musgraves are prescient. The appropriate allocation of proﬁts between
multiple jurisdictions has become one of the most signiﬁcant burdens borne by
international tax administrators – with traditional approaches, including the arm’s
length approach, proving to be unworkable.

3

Subsequent Reﬁnements and Applications

Peggy Musgrave is such a proliﬁc scholar that I can scarce claim to have found every
contribution she published that has dealt with inter-nation equity. Nevertheless,
hopefully, what follows at least summarizes her continued work to make sense of
what equity might mean between nations.
This review commences with Peggy Musgrave’s 1974 article on tax differentials
for multinational corporations and ends with her 2006 essay on national taxation in
a globalizing world.5 I review her contributions in chronological order, hoping to
reveal developments and themes as they emerge in her scholarship. If one were to
categorize Peggy Musgrave’s post-1972 contributions in some other fashion, each
article discussed below might be considered for its contributions to two major themes.
First, Peggy Musgrave uses the concept of inter-nation (or interjurisdictional) equity
to analyze tax design issues – for example, the design of tax treaties, the process for
the allocation of proﬁts between states or nations, or the international implications
of implementing a consumption tax. In these articles, Peggy Musgrave’s use of
the concept of inter-nation equity raises deep-rooted and either under-valued or
under-appreciated concerns about the design proposals of other scholars or policymakers. Second, aspects of her articles present reﬁnements to the concept of inter5

A number of these articles are available in a collection of Peggy Musgrave’s work entitled Tax
Policy in the Global Economy: Selected Essays of Peggy B. Musgrave (2002).
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nation equity. For example, over the years, the articles has become clearer about the
relationship between reciprocity and non-discrimination; about the implications of
inter-nation equity for the deﬁnition of the tax base as distinct from the choice of
rate; and, about the need for multilateral agreement and collective action.
In 1974, Peggy Musgrave authored an article providing an overview of the
principles and issues related to the activities of multinational corporations engaged in
business across national boundaries. In this piece, she provides a succinct summary
of the argument set out in the 1972 article: noting the different theories of efﬁciency
that suggest a credit versus deduction; highlighting the use of non-discrimination
and reciprocity principles; reviewing the difﬁculties that arise when there is more
than one country of source; and underscoring the problems associated with arm’s
length accounting and transfer pricing.
She applies the inter-nation equity concept to evaluate the OECD model tax
treaty and the UN guidelines (the UN model was not yet released) in a 1975 article.
In that article, she raises several fundamental critiques of the OECD model tax
treaty, which could equally well be applied today: she notes that the principle of
non-discrimination is not a requirement that advances inter-nation equity,6 and she
rejects the reciprocity principle suggesting, for example, that national jurisdictions
may want to pursue tax expenditure goals (for example, the promotion of domestic
growth) by exempting or reducing tax rates for its resident investors, but may not
want to offer the same incentives to foreign investors; she notes that the model
treaty fails to reﬂect some agreed upon notion of inter-nation equity; she advises
that tax treaties might be improved if they included a provision that would enable
the transfer of tax revenue from one country to the other country in cases where
such a transfer would promote inter-nation equity; she urges countries to consider
a multilateral rather than a bilateral treaty; she explains that the base division by
separate accounting is inadequate; she builds on the comment in the 1972 article
that forms of income should be dealt with in the same way (and not delineated in a
scheduler fashion), suggesting, as a consequence, that interest and royalty payments
to non-residents ‘should not be deducted from taxable proﬁts in the source country
but that appropriate costs be charged against them where appropriate’ (p. 38); she
recommends that because low-income countries have an incentive to compete on
tax rates, they should consider entering into regional tax pacts that set rates; and, she
suggests that high-income countries could support the aims of low-income countries
by taxing the proﬁts of foreign companies and branches on an accrual basis, and
providing a deferral for earnings reinvested in the low-income country. In summary,
Peggy Musgrave articulates three basic purposes for international tax treaties:

6

For example, there may well be cases where inter-nation equity permits or even suggests
discrimination is appropriate; for example, as reviewed in the 1972 article, where the foreign
investor receives economic rents.
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…(1) to establish reasonable rules for inter-nation equity (tax share of the
source country); (2) to provide for an economically meaningful and generally
agreed upon division of the tax base; and (3) to ensure a non-arbitrary and
even-handed tax treaty by the country of source income (p. 38).
These basic purposes are quite far from the generally trotted out concerns of the
avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of ﬁscal evasion; yet, they seem
much more aligned with an appropriate function for tax treaties. Our current tax
treaties would undoubtedly look a good deal different if these purposes had been
adopted.
In 1984, she builds on some of the elements from the 1972 piece in deﬁning
principles for dividing the state corporate tax base. This piece is a leading contribution
to the debates about how to implement a formulary apportionment approach, a
dilemma that has echoes in the context of allocating income among multiple nationstates. In this paper, Peggy Musgrave reviews possible answers to each of the major
decisions required for the implementation of formulary apportionment of state
corporate taxes, including
(1) the deﬁnition of the tax base; (2) the choice of an apportionable unit;
(3) the determination of taxable nexus; (4) the choice of formula; (5) the
measurement of formula elements; and (6) the choice of a tax rate. (p. 235)
Although the article, which focuses on the choice of formula, does not explicitly
address how the approach suggested connects with interjurisdictional equity, as is
the case in the international arena, each decision needs to be explored for its effect
on the fair share of the tax base.
Peggy Musgrave’s focus on the implications of inter-nation equity for coordination
and cooperation begins to show through in 1991. In a piece on ﬁscal coordination
and competition, she conceptually reﬁnes the 1972 argument (Musgrave, 1991).
Although in a few pieces Peggy Musgrave distinguishes between how inter-nation
equity might be distinguished as it applies to the base upon which source tax is
applied and the rate at which that tax is applied, in this piece she most clearly
delineates those questions, and each is considered in turn. On the allocation of tax
bases among source jurisdictions, continuing the argument examined earlier, Peggy
Mustrave argues in favour of some form of formulary apportionment. However,
in this piece, the emphasis on the need for mutual agreement or cooperation is
underscored considerably. This theme is drawn out further in articles authored
in 2000 and 2001, discussed below. As a second contribution, in this piece she
also notes that inter-nation equity suggests that where public goods have spillover
effects that cross borders, a beneﬁting nation should provide compensation to the
providing nation (p. 296).
In 1992, Peggy Musgrave again applied the concept of inter-nation equity in
her analysis of the consumption tax (R-based tax) proposed by Charles McLure. In
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her gentle critique of his proposal,7 she lauds him for considering the concepts of
‘source entitlement’ and ‘inter-nation equity’ but takes issue with his application of
those concepts:
Customary practice, evolved over centuries and expressed in national tax
codes and in international tax treaties, is based on the exercise of entitlement
to tax all income at its source and real property at its situs. The position
seems to be that this is a ‘right’ of the country of source exchanged for the
‘privilege’ accorded the foreign factors to engage in income-earning activity
within that country. The concept does not depend on the provision of beneﬁts
nor on the national effort involved in the creation of the capital, whether
human or physical. International tax treaties have not only conﬁrmed that
principle, but have further introduced the rule of ‘reciprocity’ in tax shares
of source countries, at least insofar as they apply to interest and dividends
paid from the source country. Thus, I am skeptical in principle as to the
acceptability of McLure’s limited interpretation of source entitlement,
especially in a global economy in which factor movements are becoming
ever more signiﬁcant (p. 181).
Despite the Musgraves’ rich analysis of the concept of inter-nation equity, which
would suggest that (at least using inter-nation equity as an evaluative criteria) Peggy
Musgrave could have demolished McLure’s piece, as revealed by the above excerpt,
she simply responds to his proposal with recourse to customary practice and its
potential for acceptability.
In a thoughtful article on consumption tax proposals published in 2000, Peggy
Musgrave provides a restatement of the case for inter-nation equity in that context,
rearticulating the 1972 argument for harmonized rates:
The rate of tax applied at source should also be a matter of international
agreement and again be based on a standard of inter-nation equity. An
obvious rule would call for internationally equal rates of tax on income
accruing to nonresident corporations. Bilateral tax treaties usually call for
such reciprocally equal rates to be applied to withholding taxes, but income
taxes are held to be subject to a rule of non-discrimination whereby resident
and non-resident taxpayers are subject to the same rate of tax. International
equity requires, however, that reciprocity also should hold with respect
to such taxes in combination with withholding taxes. The rates applied
to residents are governed by domestic tax policy considerations, such as
taxpayer equity or economic growth, whereas those applied to non-residents
should be determined by the appropriate share of their income earned at
source (2000a, pp. 82–83).
7

She states ‘McLure’s interpretation of source entitlement is one possibility, but to my mind
not the most compelling one.’ (p. 181).
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Musgrave concludes that inter-nation equity is difﬁcult to achieve when there are
fundamental differences (for example, between income and consumption taxes)
between trading countries (pp. 98–99).
In another article published in 2000, Peggy Musgrave considers the implications
of interjurisdictional equity for the European Union (2000b). This piece adds in a
few ways to the 1972 argument. First, after stating the beneﬁts and rents justiﬁcations
for source taxation, under the rubric of the territorial sovereignty justiﬁcation it
clariﬁes the relationship between reciprocity and non-discrimination principles in
the context of corporate taxes at source. This statement of the relationship between
reciprocity and non-discrimination is articulated more clearly in this 2000 piece
than in the earlier 1972 essay:
…inasmuch as [company taxes] do not generally correspond to beneﬁts
provided by the host government, nor can they be regarded as forms of
rental charges, those rates have to be set as a matter of interjurisdictional
agreement based on mutually agreed notions of fairness. In this context, it
seems reasonable to conclude that, in order to resolve conﬂict, the principle of
reciprocity should apply. Reciprocity suggests that each pair of jurisdictions
should tax the proﬁts earned by residents of the other at equal rates and
contrasts with the more generally applied rule of non-discrimination, which
requires that each jurisdiction tax the income earned by investors from
abroad at the same rate that income accruing to domestic investors is taxed.
Reciprocity, imposed in a pure form as a standard of [interjurisdictional
equity], would call for [the source jurisdiction] to tax proﬁts accruing to
investors resident in different jurisdictions at different rates, each rate being
equal to that imposed by the other. A limited reciprocity rule has, in fact,
been adopted in a number of international tax treaties whereby withholding
taxes are applied at equal rates by each treaty partner to investment income
but this rule has not been applicable to [company taxes] at source (p. 53).
Second, this piece adds to what inter-nation equity means in the context of the
setting of the tax rate. Peggy Musgrave incorporates redistributive concerns directly
into her discussion of the applicable rate. Here, she reiterates the 1972 position that
rates may increase inversely with the level of per capita income. In addition, she
restates and clariﬁes again her argument in favour of the reciprocal treatment, but
not in favour of non-discrimination, adding two possible alternative approaches to
achieving interjurisdictional equity for corporate taxes. Approach one contemplates
setting the domestic corporate tax rate at a level that achieves domestic tax policy
goals, while setting corporate tax rates for foreigners at a rate reciprocally agreed
to by the trade partner:
The quid pro quo approach embodied in the principle of reciprocity seems in
line with an acceptable standard of [interjurisdictional equity], but it makes
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little sense to conﬁne it to the low-rate withholding taxes only. The argument
can be made that the reciprocity rule should apply to the company tax in
combination with withholding taxes, so that each pair of countries take the
same share of proﬁts earned by residents of the other. This would mean a
replacement of the prevailing non-discrimination rule for [company taxes]
with that of reciprocity and require a major change in traditional international
rules of the game. The tax rate applied to non-resident proﬁts would then be
determined by considerations of [interjurisdictional equity], whereas that
applied to proﬁts earned by residents should be determined by considerations
of domestic tax policy, such as resident taxpayer equity (pp. 59–60).
The alternative approach involves maintaining non-discriminatory company
taxation, but implementing reciprocity through the use of withholding taxes.
Third, this article adds to her 1972 article by applying her theory of
interjurisdictional equity in the context of the European Union which requires tax
systems to be designed not only with neutrality and interjurisdictional equity in mind,
but also with regard to the principle of subsidiarity. The Musgraves’ conception of
inter-nation equity is, of course, particularly apt in the context of the European
Union because since its earliest articulation it imagined a tax design that would
enable the source state to achieve its own domestic policy goals, largely because of
their willingness to dispense with the strictures of non-discrimination.
Although even the early 1972 piece highlights the need for collective or
collaborative action between nations to preserve inter-nation equity, by 2001, Peggy
Musgrave developed a much richer analysis of the need for a cooperative stance
(Musgrave, 2001). On the issue of the appropriate share of the tax base, drawing on
her work in the state context, she reiterates the need for international agreement on
a formula for apportioning the tax base among countries of source. She proposes
that ‘one possible formula among many might contain elements which measure
on the supply side each country’s share of the ﬁrm’s factors of production, such
as labor and capital, and on the demand side its contribution to the ﬁrm’s sales.’
(p. 1345) Similarly, she argues that the tax rate should be the subject of international
cooperation and agreement. Her argument here is a familiar one (in the light of her
earlier work, and the 1972 piece by the Musgraves); however, she provides a novel
illustration, assuming the common tax rate to be 30 per cent:
Clearly, the usual treaty requirements of non-discrimination with respect to
the corporate income tax combined with reciprocity of withholding tax rates
is unsatisfactory with respect to inter-nation equity. If, for administrative
or other reasons, the non-discrimination rule must apply to the corporation
income tax, then withholding tax rates on the remitted income might be
adjusted to yield, in combination with the proﬁts tax rate, and internationally
agreed rate. Thus, if country S’s statutory rate of corporate tax is 25 per cent,
then S’s permitted withholding rate (WT) would be obtained from the
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equation (.30 = .25WT(1.0 – .25)] or 6.7 per cent. If, on the other hand,
country S’s corporate rate were 40 per cent, its withholding rate would be
negative, calling for a refund rate of 1.7 per cent (p. 1346).
Perhaps not surprisingly, also, in determining which states need to cooperate
to achieve which goals of international taxation, Peggy Musgrave observes that
inter-nation equity requires agreement by the source states and international
efﬁciency requires agreement by the residence states. She calls for trading blocs
to work collaboratively to design multilateral agreements, or perhaps even for an
international body to be charged with administering the corporation income tax, in
particular.
This 2001 piece reﬂects a more pragmatic approach to inter-nation equity than
that reﬂected in the 1972 article, and reﬂects Peggy Musgrave’s considered view
on the feasibility of multi-jurisdictional agreement. Inter-nation equity is deﬁned
as equal tax shares by the countries of source in income accruing to both corporate
and individual foreign investors. It balances the goals of inter-nation equity with
the ability of individual nations to choose tax rates on domestic-source proﬁts
by advocating for the application of the inter-nation equity standard on remitted
earnings only, leaving retained earnings to be taxed at the domestic rate (which also
preserves non-discrimination).
Finally, in a recent contribution in 2006, Peggy Musgrave commences her tour
de force review of ‘national taxation in a globalizing world’ by laying out some of
the fundamental questions of international tax:
How should tax bases be divided? Which jurisdictions should be entitled to
tax what part of the base and at what rate? How is inter-nation equity to be
determined…? Should these issues be resolved through the policy choices
of single jurisdictions, should they be settled by tax competition, or will
coordinating measure secured through cooperative agreements be needed
to attain equitable and efﬁcient results? How compatible will such rules be
with the freedom of jurisdictions to choose their own tax systems, or will
uniformity be required (pp. 167–168)?
It is a revealing exercise to compare these questions to the questions posed
at the outset of the Musgraves’ 1972 piece. The questions about the division of
base and rate have become conceptually distinguished and reﬁned. The question
of inter-nation equity would now be familiar to modern tax lawyers and policymakers and to public ﬁnance scholars given the efforts of the Musgraves in the
previous 35 years. Tax competition concerns, identiﬁed in the 1972 essay as the
likely consequence of the failure to take inter-nation equity seriously, has become a
predominant concern of many tax law scholars. The need for cooperative solutions
to promote equity and efﬁciency is palpable, and Peggy Musgrave’s recent work
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underscores the importance of this consideration, although her work in this regard
has not received its due in public policy-making.
Indeed this paper presents a thoughtful return to the 1972 essay and to much of
Peggy Musgrave’s subsequent work reﬁning the conceptualization and application
of inter-nation equity: it revisits the distinction between taxpayer equity and internation equity; it details the difference between ‘national’ and ‘international’ views
of taxpayer equity; it restates the case for multilateral agreements and potentially
for an international tax authority; it lays out the concerns with arm’s length pricing;
and it forcefully articulates the need for reciprocity but not for non-discrimination
(except in the context of retained earnings).
Peggy Musgrave then applies her reﬁned concept of inter-nation equity to the
appropriate approach to the integration of personal and corporate income taxes. For
example, if a country adopts a dividend-received credit, the source country may
still tax an equitable share of the earnings to be distributed to non-residents, and
therefore, inter-nation equity is not affected. However, if a dividends-paid credit is
adopted (where the corporation receives a deduction for dividends paid), then the
source country is not able to keep an appropriate share of the tax revenue unless a
withholding tax is imposed on dividends paid to non-residents. Peggy Musgrave
also considers the dual income tax, concluding that it has the possibility to preserve
inter-nation equity, provided the corporate proﬁts tax is collected at source rather
than in the hands of the recipients, or provided compensatory withholding taxes are
introduced.

4

Inter-Nation Equity: A Widely Accepted Criterion for the
Evaluation of International Tax Systems

The concept of inter-nation equity as developed by the Musgraves has been
employed by scholars working in the area of international tax. Again, because of the
signiﬁcance of the concept, and its deployment by a broad range of law, economics,
and public policy scholars, I cannot claim to have found every piece that relies on
the Musgraves’ work. What follows, however, hopefully provides a summary of
the uses (and misuses) of the concept. There are, of course, innumerable authors
who simply make some passing reference to the concept, without much or any
elaboration.8 Others draw on the 1972 article, or Peggy Musgrave’s other work, but
focus on its analysis of efﬁciency.9 These articles are not reviewed here. Instead,
what follows is an effort to classify the ways in which subsequent scholars have
understood, used, applied, or enhanced the concept of inter-nation equity articulated
8
9

See, simply to illustrate the point, Diane Ring’s article ‘One Nation Among Many: Policy
Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage’ (2002, p. 163).
Most notable among there, perhaps, is Michael Graetz in ‘Taxing International Income:
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies’ (2001, pp. 284–
294). In that article Graetz also employs Musgrave’s concept of inter-nation equity, without
articulating particular concerns about the concept’s prior use or application (pp. 297–299).
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by the Musgraves. Before commencing with a review of those articles, however,
two signiﬁcant analyses of the Musgraves’ work should be noted.
In 1974 Mitsuo Sato and Richard Bird presented a thorough review of the
Musgraves’ 1972 essay in their piece, ‘International Aspects of the Taxation of
Corporations and Shareholders’ (pp. 421–429). In their article, Sato and Bird note
that ‘a crucial issue in international tax policy concerns the sharing of the gains from
foreign investment between capital exporting and capital-importing countries’ and
that ‘“inter-country equity”, as it may be called, is analytically more difﬁcult, but
perhaps practically more signiﬁcant, than the efﬁciency concepts...’ (p. 421). Sato
and Bird also reiterate that inter-country equity is not concerned with the gains or
losses to treasuries; review the beneﬁt, rental, and redistributive criteria for deﬁning
inter-country equity; discuss the difﬁculty of the non-discrimination principle
in a world where corporate taxes are integrated in some fashion;10 and propose
a principle of ‘effective reciprocity’. On this later point, Bird and Sato elaborate
on the system of coupling corporations taxes with withholding taxes to achieve a
degree of reciprocity between nations. Although the Musgraves are clear that the
concept of inter-nation, or inter-country, equity is most important between high- and
low-income countries, Sato and Bird highlight that this is the most relevant context
for the application of the concept.
The second signiﬁcant analysis of the concept of inter-nation equity was
undertaken by Nancy Kaufman. In her 1998 piece, Kaufman updates and reviews
the concept of individual equity; argues that inter-individual equity does not require
world-wide taxation; and defends the jurisdiction of source countries to tax. She
then turns to the difﬁcult question of developing standards for inter-nation equity.
In this part of her work, she reviews in detail the development of Peggy Musgrave’s
analysis of inter-nation equity over the course of Peggy Musgrave’s scholarship on
inter-nation equity and contrasts it with the work of the League of Nations on their
theory of taxation based on economic allegiance. Kaufman concludes with a call
for a richer discussion of the content of inter-nation equity, a plea for international
consensus and a reiteration of her argument that fairness in international tax does
not necessitate a worldwide tax base.
The remaining part of this section describes how subsequent authors have used
the concept of inter-nation equity. First, some authors have sought to distinguish
different approaches to the conceptualization of inter-nation equity. For example,
in a 1992 piece, Hugh Ault distinguishes between the economists approach to internation equity (citing the work of the Musgraves) and the approach taken by noneconomists (p. 577).11 The need to distinguish between these two concepts arises
10
11

This section of the Sato and Bird piece elaborates on the review in the 1972 essay by the
Musgraves.
Ault does not elaborate extensively on what inter-nation equity might mean to non-economists.
(‘…the gain from the treaty, both in terms of tax revenues and investment ﬂows and internation equity, is achieved if both partners view the bargain as improving their positions.’)
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because many (presumably largely legal) scholars use inter-nation equity to invoke
some sense of the fairness of the tax revenue split between two (or more) countries,
each of whom might (for some other reason) have a claim to that revenue. To
illustrate, the use of inter-nation equity as a means of discussing the fairness of a tax
revenue allocation between jurisdictions can be found in discussions of international
avoidance and evasion concerns (Stathis, 2004, p. 35),12 the international tax treatment
of partnerships (Forst, 1996, p. 252),13 reform of the permanent establishment
principle (Cockﬁeld, 2003 p. 404), the general criteria for international tax fairness
(Brokelind, 2006, p. 127; Eden, 1998, p. 73; Hettich and Winer, 2004 pp. 116–117),
the possible design of a global proﬁt split (Li, 2002, pp. 826–27),14 the evaluation of
alternative proposals for the taxation of multinationals (Fernandez and Pope, 2002,
pp. 123–124),15 and the treaty design principles employed by the OECD (Alley and
Bentley, 2005, pp. 602). There are, of course, circumstances where it is unclear
whether or not the scholar is employing a concept of ‘inter-nation equity’ that turns
in some way on the allocation of tax revenue, or tax base, between jurisdictions, or
the consequences of the decision to impose a source tax (Avi-Yonah, 1996).16
Additionally, some scholars appear to invoke thinner versions of inter-nation
equity than that elaborated upon by the Musgraves. For example, employing a
vision of inter-nation equity, William Barker argues for a reinterpreted form of
source taxation (using residence as a proxy for the where the income-producing
value originates) and leaving the host country taxation of economic rent only (2001,
p. 185). Vincent Avagliano applies Barker’s analysis and suggests that inter-nation
equity is largely about source taxation of rent (2005, p. 684).
Second, many authors have applied the concept to a range of additional
international tax contexts. For example, John McNulty has used it in his argument
for extending integration (1994, p. 245),17 Pamela Fuller employs it to argue for
a rethinking of international tax treaties generally, building on her analysis of the
Japan-US tax treaty (2006, p. 838), Anne Schäfer explores inter-nation equity as
a criteria for evaluating possible reforms to international company taxation given
12

13
14
15
16
17

Dionisios Stathis reﬂects ‘[I]n the international sphere, the rapid growth of tax avoidance
schemes and techniques may be detrimental to inter-nation equity, emerging from tax
differentials.’’
David Forst notes ‘Another international tax issue with a foundation in equity is the effect of
the allocation of taxing claims on national treasuries.’
Jinyan Li writes ‘Unlike inter-nation equity, which is concerned with the allocation of tax
revenue between countries…’
Fernandez and Pope assert ‘there should be fairness in the allocation of tax revenue between
different countries.’
Avi-Yonah observes ‘there may also be costs in terms of what Peggy Musgrave calls ‘internation equity,’ i.e., the allocation of the tax base among countries.’
John McNulty also uses the concept in determining how and whether integration systems
ought to be granted to foreigners in his article ‘Integrating the Corporate Income Tax’ (1983,
p. 679).
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information and communication technologies (2006),18 Doron Herman applies
the concept of inter-nation equity to portfolio income (2002, pp.133–135), Sol
Picciotto uses it in his illustration of why academic proposals may seem utopian for
tax ofﬁcials (1989, pp. 39–40), Jinyan Li makes use of it to support her argument
about the advantages to low-income countries of abolishing tax incentives to attract
foreign direct investment (2007, pp. 707–711), John Head invokes it in discussing
the design of the corporate tax structure more generally (1997), William Park
utilizes inter-nation equity to reveal circumstances where a residence state may
choose to adopt accrual taxation (1978, p. 1629), the OECD has made efforts to
apply the concept in the context of the source taxation of business proﬁts (2007,
p. 13), Joel Trachtman reviews the concept in his analysis of when international
regulatory competition should be acceptable and when it should not (1993, pp. 72–
73), and Richard Doernberg and his co-authors apply inter-nation equity as an
evaluative criteria in their analysis of the taxation of electronic commerce (1999,
pp. 68–69).19
Third, some authors have selected and built on some aspects of the Musgraves’
analysis of inter-nation equity. For example, Karen Kole echoes Peggy Musgrave’s
call for a collaborative approach to the division of tax revenues between nations akin
to the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (1991, pp. 509), Philipp Genschel and
Markus Jachtenfuchs build on her work on inter-nation equity in the EU context
by applying the concept in the context of transfers among EU nation states (2007,
p. 12),20 Neil Brooks and Thaddeus Hwong build on the principle of redistribution
as a feature of the concept of inter-nation equity to argue that high-income countries
have a responsibility to assist low-income countries (2006, pp. 24–25), and Diane
Ring invokes the principle of redistribution that is part of the concept of inter-nation
equity as a potential means of resolving disputes between states where one state’s
claim to sovereignty is regularly overridden by the other state (2008, p. 18).21
Fourth, the principle is often called into play as a justiﬁcation for source
taxation. For example, in a European Commission economic paper it is used as a
justiﬁcation for source taxation of company income (Devereux and SØrensen, 2006,
p. 17), similarly Sijbren Cnossen invokes it in his argument for the continued use
of the source principle in company taxation (1996, p. 79), and Christoph Spengel
and Carsten Wendt invoke it as a justiﬁcation for source taxation in their piece on a
consolidated corporate tax base for the EU (2007, p. 11–12).
18
19
20
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Anne Schäfer and Christoph Spengel also apply the concept to an analysis of the impact of
information and communication technologies on proﬁt allocation (2003, pp. 6–7).
Jinyan Li does the same in International Taxation in the Age of Electronic Commerce: A
Comparative Study (2003, pp. 35–36).
Margit Schratzenstaller also used the concept in relation to transfers between EU members in
‘Corporate Taxation in Europe – Possibilities, Problems and Options for Reform’ (2000).
Sylvain Plasschaert also references the possibility of invoking inter-nation equity as a
justiﬁcation for allocating greater tax revenues to the poorer EU states (2002, p. 21).
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Finally, a small number of scholars have suggested changes to the concept
of inter-nation equity. For example, in one of the most sustained examinations
of the concept of inter-nation equity, Reuven Avi-Yonah suggests giving the
concept ‘practical meaning’ by embracing its redistributive aspect and using it as
a decision rule: where there are ‘two otherwise comparable alternative rules, one
of which has progressive and the other regressive implications for the division of
the international tax base between poorer and richer countries, the progressive rule
should be explicitly preferred to the regressive one.’ (2000, p. 1650) Ana AgúndezGarcia proposes linking inter-nation equity to taxpayer equity (where the taxpayer
in question is a corporation) in her analysis of an appropriate or fair apportionment
of an EU consolidated tax base (2006, pp. 32–37). Finally, although David Bradford
does not actually take steps to articulate a revised concept of inter-nation equity,
he notes: ‘I have always been uneasy with the notion that nations, as opposed
to individual people, have tax equity claims. It may be, however, that there is a
correlation between national welfare and the circumstances of residents of different
countries that would unify the two perspectives.’ (2003, p. 29)

5

Inter-Nation Equity: Its Meaning and Usefulness

A review of the literature drawing on the Musgraves’ notion of inter-nation equity
reveals three remarkable things. First, although the 1972 article is now 35 years old,
it is cited with regularity by scholars in their recent work. The concept continues to
have a good deal of relevance, and is widely accepted as a criterion for evaluating
international tax systems. Second, the Musgraves’ original articulation of the
concept has not been altered much by subsequent scholars, unlike, for example,
articulations of the meaning of ‘efﬁciency’ as an evaluative criterion. Few scholars
have elaborated on what inter-nation equity might mean, and in many cases, scholars
note that the criterion is an important one for evaluating international tax systems;
yet, they do not actually provide a thorough review of how the particular aspect
of international tax under examination measures up against the criterion. Third,
although the concept of inter-nation equity has been employed by a large number
of scholars, the number would be dwarfed by the number of scholars who have
written extensively about content and application of the concept of efﬁciency in the
international context.22 Inter-nation equity is a widely accepted, but undervalued
international tax evaluative criterion.
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The preoccupation has been remarked upon by others, of course. For example, Tim Edgar
and Ewan McCann note ‘This accepted jurisdictional division of the international income tax
base contrasts sharply with the standard policy prescriptions found in much of the economics
literature. To some extent, the contrast can be attributed to a fundamental preoccupation in
this literature with the speciﬁcation of an efﬁcient or optimal international tax regime, which
tends to ignore other normative considerations, such as inter-nation and inter-personal equity
(though Peggy Musgrave’s work is the exception here)…’ (2006, p. 5).
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Why has inter-nation equity been undervalued, or underutilized in the tax policy
literature, and indeed, among tax policy-makers? First, as noted by Nancy Kaufman,
discussing why it is so hard to talk about inter-nation equity, ‘…when it comes to
fairness in international taxation, or just about anything else, the failure to choose
becomes a choice in itself. The present system is not devoid of values just because
we choose not to talk about them.’ (2001, p. 1469–70) In many cases, it appears that
the concept of inter-nation equity is underutilized in part because it is ‘too vague to
provide speciﬁc guidance on the allocation question’ (Edgar, 2003, p. 1154).
That the application of a concept of inter-nation equity requires value judgements
is rarely explicitly recognized in the literature,23 and yet the lack of traction that the
concept has had for policy-makers and scholars must be at least partly explained by
that realization. Unlike questions of efﬁciency, which seem less shot through with
‘value judgments’, the idea of inter-nation equity is grounded on principles, but its
ultimate use is predicated on explicit value judgments: just how much inter-nation
equity are we willing to support?
Second, the concept is misunderstood. It might be useful, then, in conclusion,
to provide a summary of the concept. Inter-nation equity is concerned about the
relationship between national gain or loss capture between two (or more nations),
each of which has a connection to a particular gain. The national gain of the residence
state increases because its residents have invested in another jurisdiction and earned
a positive return. The question is whether the source state, the state where that return
has been earned, has any justiﬁcation for retaining some of that gain. There are a
number of policy instruments that might be employed by the source state to enable
it to retain some of the gain, but one widely recognized instrument is taxation. From
a tax perspective, the questions are whether the source state has the right to tax the
return earned within its borders; and if so, at what rate. The tax system adopted by
the residence state is irrelevant to an evaluation of inter-nation equity.
The Musgraves argue that the source state does have a legitimate claim to retain
some of the revenue derived from activity within its borders. That claim may be
based on the idea that the source state should be able to recover from the investor
some of the costs of public goods and services from which the investor beneﬁts
(a beneﬁt tax) and/or on the idea that the source state should be able to retain the
gain associated with pure economic proﬁts. These normative arguments in favour of
source taxation are widely accepted.
The more difﬁcult questions arise in considering the precise contours of the
design of a source tax that might be imposed. Is a true beneﬁts tax or a tax on pure
23

In addition to Kaufman whose remarks are mentioned above, George Kpits, explains ‘…tax
policy toward the multinational ﬁrm may be dictated by intercountry equity considerations.
These involve allocation of the ﬁrm’s tax base among the countries where it operates on
the basis of value judgments as to each country’s fair revenue share.’ (1976, pp. 662–663).
Similarly, Diane Ring notes that ‘The question of inter-nation equity incorporates both
political and moral judgment.’ (2007, p. 89).
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economic rents feasible or practical? How would it align with tax regimes currently
in existence in other countries? Since designing a tax to achieve either of these two
ends is difﬁcult, if not impossible, some version of an income and/or withholding
tax may serve as a reasonable proxy.
Imposing an income tax of any sort meets with complications. Just to highlight
an obvious one: How can tax administrators deal with issues that arise because a
separate tax is imposed on corporations? Given the mobility of corporate residence,
and the function of multinationals, the best solution seems to be to replace arm’s
length accounting with some form of proﬁt split or formulary apportionment. There
is no reason why the source state should not be able to tax the shareholders of
corporations within its jurisdiction, but the withholding tax rate imposed on those
shareholders should be set with regard to the rate imposed on domestic shareholders:
hence, the principle of reciprocal treatment should be given little weight. The
challenges are not insurmountable or without possible means of resolution.
The real challenge for tax scholars and tax policy-makers, however, seems not in
comprehending the contours of the argument in favour of source taxation provided
by the Musgraves, but rather in accepting that asking questions about inter-nation
equity, like asking questions about national redistribution with the tax system,
requires discussing openly what a sensible distribution of revenue inter-nation is.
Indeed, the whole concept of inter-nation equity is largely irrelevant in the absence
of inter-nation inequity. Presumably, if countries have roughly equal capital ﬂows,
whether they chose to tax at source or not makes no difference to their national
gain, as long as both countries can agree to adopt the same position on the matter of
source taxation. When inter-nation equity matters is when capital ﬂows are not even.
Therefore, if tax scholars and policy-makers accept the case for source taxation,
the only real question is how internationally redistributive the tax system should
be. A concept of inter-nation equity will never provide an answer to that question:
rather, it is a question that should be actively debated and discussed in much the
same fashion as we debate and discuss our redistributive aims with our national tax
systems. The mistake, then, is thinking that inter-nation equity is something other
than a tool for beginning that conversation. This is the question of the appropriate
(and potentially non-reciprocal) tax rate: a question that the Musgraves delineate in
their 1972 piece proposing possible approaches. Those approaches, for example the
idea of coordinating the setting of rates inversely with the level of per capita income,
have been largely overlooked, but they are the heart of inter-nation equity. Perhaps
they are overlooked because they are so obviously political in nature, or perhaps it
is because scholars believe that a radically coordinated tax system is impossible.
However, in the face of the growing global inequality, this question remains the
most important one facing international tax scholars and policy-makers.
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